Policy Over Borders: How Restrictive Migration Laws Are Reshaping Citizenship Planning 

In recent years, increasingly restrictive migration laws are starting to redefine the landscape of investment migration. These legal changes are prompting programs to raise their standards and strengthen due diligence processes. This analysis maps the post-2021 reshaping of investment migration, focusing on the Caribbean and Europe, and synthesizes the main policy shifts driving the field. We highlight three headline changes: stronger due diligence, tighter and more harmonized eligibility, and greater operational transparency. 

Investment migration allows individuals to obtain residence or citizenship through economic contributions. These range from Residence by Investment schemes granting legal residency for qualifying investments, to Citizenship by Investment programs offering direct citizenship through financial contributions. Such pathways demonstrate how nations strategically leverage migration policies to attract foreign investment and talent while providing varying levels of integration benefits¹. 

These programs were introduced by the states for varying reasons. For instance, the Caribbean nations introduced Citizenship by Investment programs in response to declining foreign aid, the 2008 financial crisis, and devastating natural disasters that severely impacted their economies. Dominica pioneered the concept in 1983, formalizing it by 1993, while Saint Kitts and Nevis incorporated CBI into their 1984 Citizenship Act shortly after independence. Initially attracting wealthy individuals seeking enhanced mobility through visa-free travel, these programs now appeal to applicants motivated by personal security, political stability, and broader economic opportunities². 

As the introduction of similar programs became more widespread across the world, the immigration rules tightened and raised several security concerns. This situation has put the investment migration industry at a key turning point: facing closer examination over potential issues, while also being recognized for the economic benefits it brings to both investors and host countries. 

Criticism toward CBI programs comes in various forms: In Washington, officials have warned that certain citizenship and residency-by-investment (CBI/RBI) schemes, particularly those in the Caribbean, like St. Kitts and Nevis or Antigua and Barbuda, and in Europe prior to recent restrictions, can enable individuals to secure passports with insufficient vetting. This, they caution, risks granting criminals, sanctioned persons, or even terrorists visa-free access to other nations, indirectly affecting U.S. border security.  

Responding to these concerns, the Trump administration rolled out a Visa Bond Pilot Program in August 2025, requiring citizens from certain CBI nations deemed high-risk to post bonds of up to USD 15,000 when applying for U.S. tourist visas, in a bid to deter overstays and ensure compliance. The program is set to run until August 2026³.  

In Europe, the legal pushback has been even more decisive. The European Court of Justice’s Grand Chamber ruled unanimously against Malta’s CBI program, finding that offering citizenship in exchange for a predetermined payment without any genuine link to the country violated EU law. The court described the scheme as the “commercialization” of Union citizenship, a status it declared “is not for sale.” The ruling set a legal precedent that makes it difficult for other EU nations to launch similar programs without fundamentally restructuring them to ensure authentic connections to the country⁴.  

A number of scholars have taken a critical view of the EU’s stance. Kochenov portrays investment migration as a legitimate and potentially highly beneficial practice, criticizing the European Commission for portraying it solely as a security and corruption risk while ignoring its economic gains. The author also argues that problems like money laundering or tax evasion stem from poor regulation, not from naturalization itself, and should be addressed through transparency and oversight rather than prohibition. Emphasizing state sovereignty under the Hague Convention and EU law, the author frames investment migration as both lawful and valuable when properly managed⁵.  

Furthermore, as highlighted by Surak, as with any policy, Citizenship by Investment (CBI) and Residence by Investment (RBI) schemes carry potential risks, but actual harms are more limited. When assessing these programs, there is a need to balance these risks against tangible benefits and real-world operations. Well-designed programs can effectively mitigate vulnerabilities, and international agencies should base their risk assessments on accurate data and representative samples⁶.  

In response to international concerns, there have been countless measures undertaken: 

Several Caribbean nations have taken collective action to strengthen their Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) programs. Four Eastern Caribbean states – Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, and St Kitts and Nevis, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in March 2024 to standardize their CBI schemes. This agreement established a uniform minimum investment of USD 200,000, required enhanced due diligence, and created a framework for regional regulatory oversight⁷. 

St. Kitts & Nevis restructured its Citizenship by Investment Unit in 2024, transforming it into an official statutory body overseen by a Board of Governors. It also launched the “Saturn” e-processing platform and created a Continuing International Due Diligence (CIDD) Unit to enable audit trails and post-naturalization monitoring⁸. Meanwhile, Dominica codified mandatory interviews (16+) and enhanced due diligence in 2023, making previously discretionary checks a legal requirement⁹.  

Following the European Court of Justice’s ruling against its citizenship-by-investment model, Malta restructured its program into a Citizenship by Merit framework. The new system emphasizes individual assessment rather than standardized processing, with applications evaluated based on specific merits and circumstances. This transition aims to comply with EU legal standards toward demonstrating genuine links between applicants and Malta through residency, integration, and economic contribution, addressing ECJ concerns about the “commercialization” of Union citizenship¹⁰. 

Other changes include Portugal’s (Law 56/2023) removal of real-estate purchases from Golden Visa eligibility and its redirection of capital to more regulated, productive channels¹¹.   

Moreover, Greece (Law 5100/2024¹²) raised the program’s investment thresholds and introduced property-use limits, aiming to deter speculation and improve transparency.  

Thus, what can be observed are concrete legal changes including new acts, threshold hikes, and usage bans, alongside operational integrity tools such as mandatory interviews, FIU checks, shared denial lists, and digital case systems, complemented by regional coordination.  

Moreover, alongside the concerns, there is also recognition of the legitimate benefits that well-run investment migration programs can provide. The next section highlights these benefits, to paint a full picture of why many governments and investors find value in these schemes. 

By some estimates, the investment migration industry generates over USD$20 billion annually as of 2021, with some countries deriving upwards of 50% of their GDP from these schemes¹³.

For many smaller nations, particularly in the Caribbean and Pacific, citizenship or residency sales have become essential economic drivers. These programs generate substantial foreign direct investment and revenue supporting national development. An International Monetary Fund study found that five Eastern Caribbean countries with Citizenship by Investment programs earned an average of 6.5% of GDP from CBI during 2019–2023 which is a significant contribution for small economies¹⁴.  

Furthermore, individual country impacts are even more pronounced: St. Kitts and Nevis derived 14% of its GDP from its citizenship program in 2014, preventing economic recession by offsetting what would have been negative growth¹⁵. Dominica‘s CBI income reached unprecedented levels – reportedly up to 37% of GDP in 2022¹⁶ (the percentage was a bit lower according to IMF standing at 33%), providing government funds for public works and budget support. These revenues have practical applications: Dominica has channeled citizenship funds toward hurricane recovery, building climate-resilient infrastructure and housing. Antigua and Barbuda used CBI proceeds to rebuild Barbuda after Hurricane Irma, while Grenada allocates 40% of its CBI income to a contingency fund for debt reduction and disaster response¹⁷. Investment migration thus provides essential development and resilience capital for countries with limited alternative funding sources. 

In Europe, visa-granting countries received approximately €25 billion in total FDI through these programs over the past decade, with Portugal’s program contributing about €6.8 billion of that investment¹⁸. Such inflows generate multiplier effects: housing developments, tourism facilities, and business ventures funded by investor capital contribute to employment and GDP growth in host countries. 

As demonstrated in Caribbean cases, even conservative estimates of program revenues reveal substantial proportions of GDP. Application fees alone have become crucial government revenue sources in several countries. Should these programs cease or face restrictions, significant short-term economic impacts would likely follow, potentially forcing countries to seek IMF loans to address resulting fiscal gaps¹⁹.  

Finally, at the individual level, passports vary significantly in the freedoms and opportunities they afford. For individuals from countries with restricted visa-free travel or limited economic prospects, investment migration programs offer substantial opportunities to access enhanced global mobility, security, and prospects that would otherwise remain unattainable. 

Taken together, the recent wave of reforms has moved investment migration from a transactional model to a compliance-centered governance framework with demonstrable positive impact. Across programs, authorities have institutionalized due-diligence upgrades (e.g., mandatory interviews, FIU-level screening, collective denial lists, and post-naturalization monitoring), harmonized standards (common price floors and shared data protocols), and tightened investment parameters (higher thresholds, property-use limits, and the removal of risk-prone real-estate routes). These measures are complemented by operational transparency tools, digital case-management systems that create auditable trails, and by active enforcement, including revocations and independent audits that address legacy weaknesses. The effect is a sector that is measurably more transparent, better aligned with FATF/EU expectations, and more resilient to illicit-finance risks, while still delivering the development benefits that well-run programs can provide by generating substantial economic impact, financing national development initiatives, and providing enhanced mobility for individuals.